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Appendix A: Proofs
General specification of the Appendix B: Abstract. This paper builds a model of investment and ﬁnancing that incorpo-
rates heterogeneous ﬁrms into general equilibrium. In order to characterize the
ﬁnancial structure of an economy, the model connects the share of market ﬁnance
in total external ﬁnance and the distribution of ﬁrm sizes into a simple structural
equation, with parameters related to the cost of market ﬁnance (compared to inter-
mediated ﬁnance). We estimate the relative cost of market ﬁnance across countries
with data on external ﬁnancing and ﬁrm sizes from France, Germany, Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom. Using the structural model, we propose an explanation
of the empirical correlation across countries between estimated ﬁnancing costs and
the characteristics of the population of ﬁrms based on welfare maximization.
JEL classification. E20, E44, C13.
Keywords. Heterogeneous ﬁrms, ﬁnancing patterns, distribution of ﬁrm sizes,
structural estimation, welfare analysis.
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December 2006Non-technical summary
This paper analyzes how ﬁnancial systems diﬀer across countries and how ﬁnancial
structure interacts with the real economy. We estimate country speciﬁc ﬁnancing
costs characterizing the ﬁnancial systems using a model of investment and ﬁnancing
that incorporates heterogeneous ﬁrms into general equilibrium. We then use the
model to explore the welfare consequences of the match between ﬁnancial structure
and the characteristics of the population of ﬁrms.
First using data on external ﬁnancing and ﬁrm sizes from France, Germany, Italy,
Spain and the UK, we ﬁnd that the UK and Germany have a low cost of market
ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance while Italy has a high relative cost of market
ﬁnance. Indeed in the UK and Germany the ﬁnancial system channels market ﬁnance
to all industries while in Italy, it allocates funds through ﬁnancial markets mainly to
industries with a high proportion of large ﬁrms. Moreover, we also ﬁnd a negative
correlation between the cost of market ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance and
the proportion of large ﬁrms.
Second to interpret these empirical ﬁndings, we explore the welfare predictions of
the model. Using the welfare of private agents (entrepreneurs and investors) as a
proxy for the marginal incentives to modify the ﬁnancing costs or the distribution
of productivity, we show that the ﬁnancial structure and the characteristics of ﬁrms
are complementary in following sense. On the one hand, economies with a high
proportion of very productive (and therefore very large) ﬁrms have a higher incentive
than economies with smaller ﬁrms to decrease the cost of market ﬁnance (relative
to intermediated ﬁnance). On the other hand, economies with a low cost of market
ﬁnance (relative to those with a high relative cost) have an incentive to increase the
proportion of very productive ﬁrms.
The main policy implication from this study is that ﬁnancial systems should be
evaluated in terms of how they match the external ﬁnancing needs of the population
of heterogeneous ﬁrms. In particular, our sample of industrialized countries suggests
a good ﬁt between ﬁnancial structure and ﬁrm characteristics.
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December 2006How does ﬁnancial structure aﬀect investment and consumption? Cross-country re-
gressions have shown that the development of ﬁnancial markets and intermediaries
matters for economic growth (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). Yet it has been diﬃcult
to identify the mechanisms through which ﬁnancial markets or intermediaries aﬀect
the real economy, in part because of poor measurement and lack of clear exogeneity
of the ﬁnancial structure. That is, the observed ﬁnancial system is endogenous in the
sense that it also depends on the population of ﬁrms. For instance, the share of mar-
ket ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance, typically used to classify ﬁnancial systems into
“market-based” and ”intermediary-based”, depends not only on the cost of market
ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance, but also on the proportion of large ﬁrms in
the economy.1
This paper estimates an equilibrium model of investment and ﬁnancing that links
and extends the corporate ﬁnance and asset pricing literatures. First, we show that
the identiﬁcation of the ﬁnancing costs depends on a property of the equilibrium
that solves the endogeneity problem: the share of market ﬁnance in external ﬁnance
is more sensitive to the cost of market ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance in
industries with smaller ﬁrms. Second, observing the allocation of market and inter-
mediated ﬁnance across industries with diﬀerent ﬁrm size distributions, we recover
the relative cost of market ﬁnance across countries with data from France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Third, we use the estimated relative cost of
market ﬁnance to assess the relation between ﬁnancial structure and technology. We
show that ﬁnancial systems with a low cost of market ﬁnance are better matched to
technologies with a high proportion of very productive ﬁrms (and reciprocally) which
is consistent with our data on developed countries.
1To illustrate this endogeneity problem, take a typical test to assess whether “bank-based” or
“market-based” ﬁnancial systems are better (see Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002). It consists in re-
gressing the growth of a country on the share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance (for a given
horizon). Yet large ﬁrms raise more market ﬁnance (see below) and grow less (see for instance Cooley
and Quadrini, 2001). So a country with a high proportion of large ﬁrms should have mechanically
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December 2006In the model at the microeconomic level, an entrepreneur raises external ﬁnance
from outside investors through ﬁnancial markets and intermediaries. Like in the
corporate ﬁnance literature, the characteristics of the project are correlated with the
instrument choice and the investment size. The most productive ﬁrms need to raise
more external ﬁnance and because of economies of scale in the issuance size of public
securities, productivity is correlated with ﬁrm size and the probability of raising
market ﬁnance. Blackwell and Kidwell (1986) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)
argue that there are economies of scale with the issuance of public securities while
there is ample evidence that the probability of issuing market ﬁnance is correlated
with ﬁrm size.2
At the macroeconomic level, this transaction between the entrepreneur and the in-
vestors is integrated into a market equilibrium with a distribution of heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Like the asset pricing literature, the price of capital is determined by the
consumption of a representative investor allocating his capital between consumption
and investment for risky returns. The model generates at the industry level endoge-
nous distributions of ﬁrm sizes and ﬁnancing patterns given exogenous industry-level
distributions of productivity across ﬁrms and exogenous country-level ﬁnancing costs.
The identiﬁcation of the ﬁnancing costs relies on a property of the equilibrium: the
share of market ﬁnance in external ﬁnance is more sensitive to the relative cost of
market ﬁnance in industries with smaller ﬁrms. We show that this is a very general
property and it holds under generic production and utility functions. It implies
that countries in which even small-ﬁrm industries raise market ﬁnance (relative to
large-ﬁrm industries) have a low cost of market ﬁnance (compared to intermediated
ﬁnance). We recover structural parameters characterizing the ﬁnancial system at the
country level. Using data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK we ﬁnd
2See for instance Easterwood and Kapapakkam (1991); Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam
(1999); Esho, Lam, and Sharpe (2001); Denis and Mihov (2003); Kwan and Carleton (2004). In this
paper, the main ﬁrm characteristic to be correlated with the probability of raising market ﬁnance
is productivity. It is possible to study several factors correlated with the probability of raising
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December 2006that the cost of market ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance is low for the UK
and high for Italy.
With estimates of the ﬁnancing costs, we then study the relation between ﬁnancial
structure and the characteristics of the population of ﬁrms. This paper highlights a
complementarity between ﬁnancial structure and the distribution of ﬁrm productivity.
We use the welfare of private agents (entrepreneurs and investors) as a proxy for the
marginal incentives to modify the ﬁnancing costs or the distribution of productivity.
On the one hand, economies with a high proportion of very productive (and therefore
very large) ﬁrms have a higher incentive than economies with smaller ﬁrms to decrease
the cost of market ﬁnance (relative to intermediated ﬁnance). On the other hand,
economies with a low cost of market ﬁnance (relative to those with a high relative
cost) have an incentive to increase the proportion of very productive ﬁrms.3 This is
consistent with our sample of industrialized European countries in which we ﬁnd a
negative correlation between the cost of market ﬁnance and the proportion of large
ﬁrms in the economy: the UK has both the lowest relative cost of market ﬁnance
and the largest ﬁrms, and Italy has the smallest ﬁrms and the lowest relative cost of
intermediated ﬁnance.
Related to this paper are Gin´ e and Townsend (2004) and Martin and Rey (2004).
Gin´ e and Townsend (2004) estimate structural parameters of the Thai economy to
study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization based on a general equilibrium model. The
main methodological diﬀerence is that Gin´ e and Townsend make strong parametric
assumptions to estimate most of the parameters of their model. In contrast, we
derive a particular structural equation and argue that it is very general because it
relies only on very weak parametric assumptions. Martin and Rey (2004) derive
a gravity equation for international ﬁnancial ﬂows from a model with endogenous
supply and demand of ﬁnancial assets. Our model is more general in that we focus
on the joint investment and ﬁnancing decision of an entrepreneur. Moreover, we
3This reciprocity between ﬁnancial structure and population of ﬁrms means that this approach
will be unable to identify any causal link. However it also suggests that a policy recommendation ad-
vocating a change in ﬁnancial structure regardless of the population of ﬁrms may create deadweight
costs rather than welfare gains.
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characterizing the ﬁnancial system.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a model of the ﬁnancial
system. Section II describes the identiﬁcation strategy and the empirical implemen-
tation. Section III introduces the data and shows the empirical results. Section IV
looks at the endogenous relation between ﬁnancial structure and characteristics of the
population of ﬁrms. Section V presents robustness tests of the identiﬁcation strategy.
Section VI concludes. Proofs and additional information are in the appendices.
I. An equilibrium model of the financial system.
This paper builds an equilibrium model of the ﬁnancial system with explicit mi-
croeconomic foundations. On the one hand a continuum of investors allocates funds
optimally across heterogeneous ﬁrms. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs who run
the ﬁrms set the level of investment in order to maximize their proﬁt. The supply of
securities available to the investors is endogenous and the price of capital at which
the transaction between an investor and a ﬁrm takes place depends on the population
of ﬁrms that produce. In section I.1, we illustrate the equilibrium with a representa-
tive ﬁrm. In section I.2, we introduce heterogeneity across ﬁrms. In section I.3, we
describe the ﬁnancial system and solve for the equilibrium.
I.1. Consumption and investment with a representative ﬁrm. There is a
continuum of identical investors modeled as a representative investor. This represen-
tative investor has to decide how to allocate the capital Y he owns between immediate
consumption c and investment k into a single ﬁrm. This ﬁrm has a project that pro-
duces r(k) and repays rl(k) with probability p. Otherwise it yields no income. To
take into account limited liability, we impose r(k) ≥ rl(k) ≥ 0 and the proﬁt of the
4Several papers use structural models in partial equilibrium to study the link between ﬁnancial
structure and the real economy at the entrepreneur or ﬁrm level. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) and Love (2003) identify ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms using an investment model to study
the country determinants of ﬁnancial frictions. Paulson, Townsend, and Karaivanov (2006) estimate
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December 2006ﬁrm is rb = r − rl. The probability p measures the productivity of the ﬁrm. Figure
1 summarizes the timing.








0 probability 1 − p
The parameter β is the discount factor. The investor is a price-taker and in particular
takes the price of capital ρ as given when deciding how much to consume immediately
and how much to invest in the ﬁrm for later consumption. The ﬁrst-order condition








which in turn implicitly deﬁnes the repayment rl as a function of the investment k:
rl = ˜ rl(k|p,c)
The relative risk-aversion is deﬁned by γ(c) = −
cu00(c)
u0(c) .
Assumption 1. The relative risk-aversion γ of utility u is strictly positive and
smaller than 1.
Assumption 1 means that the risk-aversion of the investor is in an intermediate range
and implies that the repayment function ˜ rl(k|p,c) is strictly increasing in the in-
vestment size k and strictly decreasing in the productivity p. A higher investment
k requires a higher repayment rl and for a given investment size, a project with a
higher probability of producing p has to promise a lower repayment rl.6 The usual
5The utility is normalized such that u(0) = 0.
6For simplicity, we do not allow any risk-free security, but this could be added without changing
qualitatively the results. Moreover, with a risk-free security, we can relax Assumption 1 for values
of γ larger than 1.
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assumption in corporate ﬁnance is that external investors are risk-neutral (ie. the rel-
ative risk aversion is equal to 0). In this case, equation (1.1) leads to the “zero-proﬁt
constraint”:
7 k = pβrl.
Production. The problem of raising external ﬁnance is to ﬁnd investors willing to
lend capital to the ﬁrm. The entrepreneur chooses the investment size to maximize
rb(k) = r(k)− ˜ rl(k|p,c). The elasticity of production is deﬁned by α(k) =
kr00(k)
r0(k) +1.
For the investment problem to have a solution we assume:
Assumption 2. The proﬁt function k 7→ r(k) − ˜ rl(k|p,c) is concave.8
This holds when the returns to scale of the production function are not too high
(relative to the risk-aversion of the investor). The following lemma yields the partial-
equilibrium decision functions of the entrepreneur given the supply of capital from
the investor:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the repayment re
l(p,c), the supply of size ke(p,c), the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt re
b(p,c) and the total production re(p,c) are increasing functions of the
probability of production p and the ﬁrst-period consumption c.
In particular, for a given p, the aggregate investment function is increasing in the
ﬁrst-period consumption c. This relation comes from an indiﬀerence condition for the
7See Tirole (2006), chapter 3.








+ γ(rl) − 1 > 0. When the production
function r is Cobb-Douglas and the utility u is CRRA, α and γ are constant.
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Consumption-Investment equilibrium. c is the ﬁrst-period consumption and k is the investment that generates









representative investor. The more the investor consumes in the ﬁrst period, the more
he expects to consume in the second period, otherwise he would shift consumption
from one period to the other. Moreover, c measures the price of capital as in a
consumption-based asset pricing model.
An equilibrium in this economy is an allocation hce,kei and a price of capital hρei such
that the investor consumes ce and allocates ke given the price ρe and such that the
ﬁrm invests ke and repays ρeke if it produces. Given the budget constraint Y = c+k
and the fact that c 7→ ke(p,c) is increasing, there exists a unique allocation hce,ke,ρei
that satisﬁes the allocation problem of the investor and the maximization of proﬁt
for the entrepreneur. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium.
Remark 1. If the project is more productive (the probability of production p increases
or the marginal productivity pr0 increases uniformly), the function ke(p,c) shifts up
and there is more investment (ie. ke increases and ce decreases). This comes from
Assumption 1 that the risk-aversion γ is smaller than 1. In that case, the substitution
12
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December 2006eﬀect dominates the wealth eﬀect and an increase in the expected return leads to an
increase in investment.9
Remark 2. The fact that the ﬁrm does not produce (and is in bankruptcy) with
probability (1 − p) is not essential and there could be non-zero production in that
state without altering the qualitative results. The assumption of only two states
(positive production with probability p, no production otherwise) is also made for
tractability.
I.2. A distribution of heterogeneous projects. There is now a continuum of
projects requiring the investment k in order to generate the revenue r(k) with a
probability density p (and 0 otherwise). To analyze the correlation structure of
production across ﬁrms, we introduce two steps for the resolution of uncertainty.
Nature picks ﬁrst how many ﬁrms produce and then which ones produce. For all
m ≤ M, we introduce the functions µm : Rm → R determining the probability
density that exactly m ﬁrms indexed by (ϕ1,..,ϕm) ∈ Rm produce at the same
time.10 For a given lower boundary ϕ0, the density f of types is such that with












f(ϕj)dϕj = 1 (1.2)
Each term indexed by m represents the probability that exactly m ﬁrms produce.
For simplicity, we assume that µ1(ϕ) = ϕ and that for each m ≥ 2, the function
µm is a constant. In this case, we diﬀerentiate the projects by their idiosyncratic
part (assuming the correlated part is symmetric across all projects). Projects with a
9Another property of the equilibrium is that steeper the investment function curve in Figure 2
the less sensitive consumption and output are to shocks to the production function. The curvature
of the investment function increases with the elasticity of production α(·) and decreases with the
relative risk-aversion γ(·).
10For instance, the probability that the two ﬁrms indexed by ϕ1 and ϕ2 produce at




ϕ0 µ2(ϕ1,ϕ2)f(ϕ2)f(ϕ1)dϕ2dϕ1. It is possible to have M = +∞ if the probability densities
µm have a suﬃcient uniform decay in m. For instance ∀(ϕ1,..,ϕm), |µm(ϕ1,..,ϕm)| < e−m
13
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December 2006higher ϕ have a higher probability of producing. The probability density of generating
positive revenues is now:11









Remark 3. If we assume perfectly eﬃcient internal allocation markets, we do not
need to deﬁne precisely the boundaries of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm can be a collection of
projects and it values individual internal projects the same way the representative
investor does.
Remark 4. The assumption of a continuum of ﬁrms is not crucial and we could
consider a large number of ﬁrms. This is done for analytical reasons.
As before, the representative investor owns the capital Y , chooses between consuming
c immediately or allocating capital k to ﬁrms for risky payoﬀs rl. He maximizes the
expected utility:


















where u is concave. The budget constraint is:










































11This is a very general formulation of the problem because it can match many patterns of
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December 2006As in section I.1, under assumption 1, the repayment function ˜ rl(k|ϕ,c) is an increas-
ing function of the investment k and a decreasing function of ϕ.12
The investor spreads his allocation across ﬁrms because he is risk-averse. Given that
only a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms produces, so that only a ﬁnite number of investments
generates a positive return, the investor cannot diversify the investment risk and he
invests in as many projects as possible.
I.3. Financial instruments and investment. This section describes how the ﬁ-
nancial structure aﬀects the ﬁnancing and investment decisions of the entrepreneurs.
We are interested in a speciﬁcation of the ﬁnancial system generating general pat-
terns of ﬁnancing with a parsimonious set of parameters. Given this requirement
we abstract from monitoring and agency problems and assume that the ﬁnancing
choice of an entrepreneur depends on the costs structures of the available ﬁnancial
instruments. We introduce the particular parametrization of the ﬁnancial system
and then describe how it aﬀects the investment decision. Appendix B shows that the
theoretical results generated by this parametrization are robust to more general cost
structures.
Institutional environment and ﬁnancing costs. We consider public securities for mar-
ket ﬁnance and private securities for intermediated ﬁnance. Public securities are
issued to a large pool of investors and are ﬂoated on secondary markets, while pri-
vate securities are sold to a limited number of specialized agents with restrictions
on inter-institution trading. In this model, the choice between public and private
securities depends on payment structures that involve (deadweight) costs.
13
12Note for any a ≥ 0, the function rl 7→ rlu0(rl + a) is increasing. Indeed, [rlu0(rl + a)]0 =
(1 − γ)u0(rl + a) − au00(rl + a) > 0 since u00 < 0.
13The ﬁnancial instruments that we consider are public and private securities. We abstract from
the Debt-versus-Equity debate for several reasons. First, we believe the main issue for the ﬁnancial
system is the relative roles of ﬁnancial markets and intermediaries. Second, a continuum of securities
between pure debt and pure equity has emerged (convertibles, preferred shares, etc.) making this
distinction less crucial than before. In this model, because there is no payment in the case of default,
debt and equity securities are identical (see Tirole 2006, chapter 3). See Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor
(2006) for a model of the choice between private and public ownership.
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of ﬁrms characterizes the ﬁnancial system:
(i) The issuance of public securities requires a ﬁxed cost η.
(ii) The issuance of private securities requires an intermediation cost which is a
combination of a per-unit-of-proﬁt cost δ and an interest rate wedge ξ.
We interpret η, δ and ξ as the marginal costs of market and intermediated ﬁnance by
assuming perfect competition inside the ﬁnancial sector, so that the price of trans-
ferring funds from investor to entrepreneurs is equal to the marginal cost.
These ﬁnancing costs arise from a number of sources. First, the cost of issuing public
securities includes the costs of underwriting (origination, distribution, certiﬁcation,
SEC registration) and of compliance with secondary market regulations (disclosure,
auditing, legal fees, accountant’s fees, trustee’s fees, preselling activities). What
characterizes market ﬁnance instruments is that they are standardized (or “com-
moditized”) into generic simple contracts: a large component of the cost of market
ﬁnance is generally made of ﬁxed costs and does not vary much with the character-
istics of the ﬁrm or the contract.
Second, the cost of issuing private securities includes the cost of intermediation (more
private capital means larger bank syndicates or more private equity ﬁrms, which
is costly), the cost of supervision (writing and enforcing covenants, involvement of
venture capitalists, etc.) and indirect costs (screening of deals, cost of illiquidity). In
contrast to market instruments, intermediated ﬁnance instruments are very ﬂexible
and the intermediary, whether a bank as in Rajan (1992) or a venture capitalist as
in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1994) has some bargaining power not only in shaping the
terms of the contract to facilitate the transaction but also to capture a share δ of
the proﬁts. An interpretation for the cost ξ can be capital requirements (for instance
imposed by the Basel I and II regulatory frameworks) which induce a wedge between
the deposit and the lending rates. We typically assume that ξ is small.14
14See Remark 5 for an explanation of the role played by the cost ξ. It is included for generality.
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(1 − δ1b)[r(k) − (1 + ξ1b)˜ rl(k|ϕ,c)] − η(1 − 1b)
where 1b is a dummy equal to 1 if intermediated ﬁnance is used (0 otherwise). The
ﬁrst-order condition is:
r




Equation (1.5) implies that there is underinvestment whenever ξ > 0. When ξ = 0,
the ﬁrst-best level of investment is set such that r0(k)−
∂˜ rl
∂k = 0 and does not depend
on which ﬁnancial instrument is being used. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm rb determines the
choice of instrument. Because of the envelope theorem, we have:
∂rb
∂ϕ




Equation (1.6) has several important implications. The proﬁt rb is increasing in
ϕ. Moreover, if the wedge ξ is small, the proﬁt of the entrepreneur is increasing
more with the type ϕ when he uses market ﬁnance instead of intermediated ﬁnance.
Finally, there exists a threshold ϕM at which ﬁrms switch from intermediated to
market ﬁnance and this threshold is unique.
For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrms with the lowest productivity level ϕ0 do not
proﬁt by raising external ﬁnance and exit. This comes for instance from some start-
up cost: r(0) < 0. This implies that there exists a threshold ϕB such that ﬁrms with
ϕ < ϕB do not raise external ﬁnance and ﬁrms with ϕ ∈ [ϕB,ϕM] raise intermediated
ﬁnance. The fact that ϕB > ϕ0 generates some endogenous incompleteness. The
representative investor is not perfectly diversiﬁed and there is residual uncertainty.
To summarize, if the proﬁt function k 7→ r(k)− ˜ rl(k|ϕ,c) is concave (Assumption 2),
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b(ϕ,c) and the total production re(ϕ,c) are
increasing functions of the productivity ϕ and of the ﬁrst-period consumption c.
Remark 5. When ξ > 0, the investment size is discontinuous because the cost struc-
ture of intermediated ﬁnance generates underinvestment for the small ﬁrms to which












Lemma 2. The aggregate investment function K(c) is increasing in c.
Similarly to the previous section, there exists a unique equilibrium in the variables
hce,ke{·},ρe{·},ϕB,ϕMi.
II. Identification of the financial structure
This section describes the estimation of the ﬁnancing costs from the observation of
the share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance and the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
The identiﬁcation stems from a property of the equilibrium at the industry-level.15
Section II.1 describes the economy at the industry level and the properties of the
equilibrium that lead to identiﬁcation of the ﬁnancing costs. Section II.2 describes
the parametrization of the ﬁrm size distribution and the empirical implementation.
II.1. Industry approach. Industries are identical except in the distribution of pro-
ductivity fi. The aggregate distribution at the country level is f =
P
i fi. We refer
15Our industry approach is related to Rajan and Zingales (1998) whose identiﬁcation strategy
also relies on the sign of a cross-derivative. The main diﬀerence is that in their context, Rajan and
Zingales argue that the industry characteristics are exogenous. Here, the industry characteristics
do not depend on the ﬁnancing costs (ie. are exogenous with respect to the ﬁnancial system) only
when there are no frictions (ie. ξ = 0). However, the theoretical model yields an identifying relation
even when observable industry characteristics are endogenous (ie. ξ > 0)
18
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From Remark 5, when there are no ﬁnancial frictions (ξ = 0), the investment size
ke(ϕ,c), the aggregate investment, the equilibrium consumption and the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes gi do not depend on the ﬁnancing costs. However, when ξ > 0, a change
in the ﬁnancial fees aﬀects the equilibrium allocation. To order the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes, we make the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. An industry i with productivity density fi has more productive ﬁrms
than industry j with productivity density fj (denoted fi  fj) if
fi(t)
fj(t) is increasing in
t. Similarly, an industry i with ﬁrm size density gi has larger ﬁrms than industry j
with ﬁrm density gj (denoted gi  gj) if
gi(t)
gj(t) is increasing in t.
This deﬁnition is related to the monotone likelihood ratio in Milgrom (1981). Milgrom
describes distributions of probabilities but such order also applies to distribution of
sizes.16 Obviously the order induced by Deﬁnition 1 is only partial: for two industries
it might be impossible to say that one has larger ﬁrms than the other. Using equation
(2.1) to compare the size distribution of two industries in the same country, an
increasing investment function k0 > 0 implies that fi  fj ⇔ gi  gj. The share of











where kB = k(ϕB) and kM = k(ϕM). We now look at properties of the equilibrium.
Lemma 3. An industry with larger ﬁrms raises more market ﬁnance:
gi  gj ⇒ Si > Sj
This result stems from the demand for market ﬁnance generated by the large ﬁrms
in an industry.
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This second lemma shows that ﬁnancing costs also aﬀect the demand for ﬁnance. A
higher eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets relative to intermediaries (because of a lower
cost of market ﬁnance η or a higher cost of intermediated ﬁnance δ) increases the
share of market ﬁnance.
Proposition 1 (Monotone sensitivity property). The share of market ﬁnance de-
creases more with the cost of market ﬁnance η in industries with small ﬁrms than in
industries with large ﬁrms:






Similarly, the share of market ﬁnance increases more with the cost of intermediated
ﬁnance δ in industries with small ﬁrms than in industries with large ﬁrms:






The implication of Proposition 1 is to provide a robust identifying restriction. This
proposition means that allocation of market ﬁnance across industries allows to make
a statement on the relative ﬁnancing costs. When industries with small ﬁrms raise
relatively large amounts of market ﬁnance (when compared to industries with large
ﬁrms) this suggests that the relative cost of market ﬁnance is low.
An intuition for Proposition 1 comes from recognizing that small ﬁrms are constrained
in raising market ﬁnance, especially in countries with costly ﬁnancial markets (relative
to intermediaries). When a decrease in the relative cost of market ﬁnance takes place,
the share of market increases in all industries. However an industry with large ﬁrms
was already raising high levels of market ﬁnance and its share of market increases by
20
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ﬁnance.
The logic of the proof for Proposition 1 is as follows. There are two cases that
are interesting to distinguish. When there are no frictions (ξ = 0), the investment
decision does not depend on the ﬁnancial instrument used, so that the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes is independent of the market and intermediated ﬁnancing costs. In this case,
a change in the ﬁnancing costs does not aﬀect the equilibrium consumption of the
agent or the aggregate investment: it only modiﬁes the threshold at which a ﬁrm raises
market ﬁnance. This frictionless case is reminiscent of a Modigliani-Miller world. It
is a good benchmark because there are reasons to think that ﬁnancial intermediaries
try to limit deadweight cost with their ﬁnancing fees (just like a government tries
to limit the deadweight loss from taxation). When the friction parameter ξ is non
zero, we have to take into account a general-equilibrium impact for the change of the
ﬁnancing cost.
II.2. Parametrization of the ﬁrm size distribution. Some evidence suggests
that Pareto and log-Normal distributions provide a good ﬁt for the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes (Axtell, 2001; Cabral and Mata, 2003). To facilitate the interpretation of
the results, we parameterize the upper tail of the ﬁrm size distribution:













where σ ∈ (0,1) and ˜ g is a constant. If n = 1, the parametrization is that of a power









. If n = 2, the distribution is a half
log Normal law. The scale parameter σ characterizes how thick the tail distribution
is. For two industries with distributions gi (parameters σi) and gj (parameters σj),
the order induced by Deﬁnition 1 is such that:
gi  gj ⇔ σi > σj
The parameter σi is then a proxy for the proportion of large ﬁrms in the industry.
Given this parametrization of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes with σi as a proxy for the
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decreasing in δ increasing in η
We consider the OLS regression for country j, industry i:
logSij = [controls] + θjσij + ij (2.3)
where θj is a country-speciﬁc slope and the controls are country dummies.17 The pa-
rameter θj is positive and decreasing in the relative eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial markets,
ie. decreasing in δ and increasing in η.
Corollary 1. Given two countries j1 and j2 and the coeﬃcients ˆ θj1 and ˆ θj2, estimated
in regression (2.3), the country j1 has more eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets (relative to
ﬁnancial intermediaries) than country j2 if ˆ θj1 is statistically smaller than ˆ θj2.
III. Estimation of the financing costs
This section presents the estimation of the cost of market ﬁnance relative to in-
termediated ﬁnance implied by the model. Section III.1 describes the sample and
the dependent variable. Section III.2 describes the empirical methods. Section III.3
shows the results.
III.1. Data sources and sample selection.
Sources. There are two sources of data. Balance-sheet and income statement infor-
mation come from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing). Information
about ﬁnancial deals is drawn from SDC Platinum New Issues (Thomson Financial).18
Amadeus provides standardized data on the balance-sheet and income statements for
several million of ﬁrms throughout Europe. The data covers both listed and non-listed
companies and is therefore well suited to characterize the full distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
17We also use a set of country and industry dummies.
18Note that in this paper we aggregate ﬁrm-level data that we match at the industry level. It is
very diﬃcult and potentially problematic to directly match balance-sheet and issuance data as the
ﬁrm level. Matching the taxable entity of a ﬁrm (for the balance-sheet data) and the ﬁnancial arm
of the ﬁrm (for the issuance data) is particularly diﬃcult since the two are generally separated.
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 702
December 2006A limitation of Amadeus is that, because of diﬀerences in accounting standards, no
size proxy (Total asset, Employment, Operating revenues, etc) is available for all
countries. Filing Operating revenues is standard in Germany but Total assets is
missing for most German ﬁrms. The opposite happens for the UK: not Total asset,
but Operating revenues is missing for most UK ﬁrms.
SDC Platinum collects data on ﬁnancing deals which allows to precisely characterize
the ﬁnancial instruments and to construct a measure of market ﬁnance in total ex-
ternal ﬁnance.19 For each deal, SDC Platinum provides information on the market
used (public or private markets), the instrument (debt, equity, hybrids), the use of
proceeds, and for syndicated bank loans, how many bookrunners participated in the
transaction.
Sample. In order to study the relationship between ﬁnancing and ﬁrm characteristics,
we match Amadeus and SDC at the industry level. The industry level of aggregation
is the “mid-industry” deﬁned by Thomson Financial.20 We focus on ﬁve big European
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) so that each
country has a large cross-section of industries.
To characterize the ﬁnancing environment we need as many deals as possible and
therefore we keep all the deals in SDC from 1990 and 2005. To characterize the ﬁrm
size distribution, we keep all the ﬁrms in Amadeus in 2003. We focus on medium-
term characteristics of the ﬁnancial system and the implicit assumption is that the
underlying structural parameters generating the distribution of ﬁrm sizes and the
share of market ﬁnance do not vary over time. In order to construct a fairly ho-
mogenous sample, the ﬁnancial and real-estate sectors as well as government-owned
companies or highly regulated or subsidized industries are excluded.21 We keep all
19Note that using only balance-sheet information is limited because it does not distinguish be-
tween bank loans, private and public debt.
20“Mid-industries” in Thomson Financial are essentially combinations of 3-digit US SIC-level
industries, and so they are slightly more precise than 2-digit US SIC-level industries.
21The regulated or subsidized industries are the “Power” and “Motion Picture / Audio Visual”
industries. Financial and real-estate sectors are excluded because ﬁnancial ratios are generally
23
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proceeds indicates that the deal is merely a change of ownership.22
The restriction we impose on industries is to have more than 10 deals in SDC, 200
ﬁrms in Amadeus and at least one public and one private deal (ie the share of market
ﬁnance strictly between 0 and 1). If either is violated, the ﬁnancing patterns or
the ﬁrm size distribution will be poorly characterized. Table 1 shows the number of
matched industries across countries.
Dependent variable: share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance. The depen-
dent variable characterizes external ﬁnancing patterns at the industry-level. The
share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance measures the proportion of ﬁnancing
raised through ﬁnancial markets. On the one hand, intermediated ﬁnance includes
all privately-placed securities (private debt, private equity and bank loans). On the
other hand, market ﬁnance includes the public securities (public bonds and public
equity). As argued by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Drucker and Puri (2006),
syndicated loans lie somewhere between private-placement debt and public securi-
ties. When a syndicated loan involves a syndicate of more than 5 bookrunners, it is










where Proceeds is the deal proceed and GDP is the GDP of the country at the
year of the deal (for aggregation over time, the deals are normalized by the country’s
GDP).
diﬃcult to compare for ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial companies and regulations of the ﬁnancial sector
tend to be country-speciﬁc.
22In that case, the holding company is the one raising external ﬁnance to potentially ﬁnance
investment. However, we simply drop these deals because the name of the holding company is not
always indicated.
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parameter that characterizes the upper tail of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes and of
relating it to the share of market ﬁnance.
Explanatory variable: distribution of ﬁrm sizes. The parametrization of the ﬁrm size
distribution introduced in section II.2 is estimated using Amadeus data. Following
Champonnois (2006), we ﬁt a distribution that extends the parametrization of g in
equation (2.2) with a lower branch accounting for the fact that the densities for small
ﬁrms and large ﬁrms are diﬀerent.24 Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt Asymmetric Exponential
Power (AEP) distributions for the log of ﬁrm size. AEP distributions are deﬁned by:





















if u ≤ t
(3.1)
where t is the location parameter, σ+ and σ− are the scale parameters for the upper
and lower tail, and n is the shape parameter.25 When n = 1, the log size logx
follows an asymmetric Laplace distribution. In this case, the size x follows a power
law for in the upper tail. When n = 2, the log size logx follows an asymmetric log
normal. The parameters (σ+,σ−,t) are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation
for each industry-country pair for n = 1 and n = 2. In particular, this provides a
scale parameter σij of the upper tail for country j, industry i.
Main regression. The predictions of the model are embedded in the estimation of the
structural equation (2.3):
logSij = [controls] + θjσij + ij (2.3)
The explanatory variable is the estimated scale parameter σij of the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes for industry i, country j. The controls include country dummies. The
country speciﬁc slope captures how the market ﬁnance is allocated across industries
with diﬀerent distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
24Extending the parametrization of equation (2.2) allows to use untrimmed data. Trimming the
data is problematic when considering a large cross-section of industries and countries.
25Γ is the Gamma function. Particular values are: Γ(2) = 1 and Γ(3/2) =
√
π/2. The Gamma
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bution of the second stage parameters depends in general on adjustments due to the
ﬁrst stage. The following lemma shows however that when the number of observa-
tions used in the ﬁrst-stage estimation (the number of ﬁrms per industry) is much
larger than the number of observations in the second stage (the number of industries)
the adjustment is asymptotically zero.
Lemma 5. For a number I of industries and a number Ni of ﬁrms in industry i, the







Table 3 shows that the adjustment is about 10% of the ﬁrst stage variance which is
of order 0.001. The adjustment is therefore very small and in what follows we neglect
it.
III.3. Results.
Estimating the ﬁrm size distribution. Table 2 presents an ordering of the countries
in terms of their distribution of ﬁrm sizes. The UK has the highest proportion of
large ﬁrms, ahead of France and Germany while Spain and Italy have the highest
proportion of small ﬁrms. Figure 3 shows the ﬁt for a particular industry. The
(asymmetric) log Normal ﬁts the general shape of the distribution weil but the upper
tail poorly. The (asymmetric) log Laplace ﬁts the upper tail distribution of ﬁrm sizes
well (Axtell, 2001; Gabaix, 2005). Overall, the value of the log-likelihood provides a
comparison of the ﬁt of the two parameterizations and in the case of Figure 3, the
log Laplace has a better ﬁt.
Comparing ﬁnancial systems. The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4
presents the OLS estimates and their t-statistics for the size proxy Total assets and
Table 5 for Operating revenues. Not surprisingly a ﬁrm’s size is an important de-
terminant of ﬁnancing. Across all parameterizations and all size proxies, we ﬁnd a
strong relation between the share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance and the
proportion of large ﬁrms. A one standard deviation increase in the scale parameter
σ leads to a 20% increase in the share of market ﬁnance for regressions (1), (3), (5)
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is consistent with the existing empirical literature conducted at the ﬁrm level which
ﬁnds a correlation between the probability of raising market ﬁnance and the ﬁrm
size (Easterwood and Kapapakkam, 1991; Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam,
1999; Esho, Lam, and Sharpe, 2001; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Kwan and Carleton,
2004).
We also get a ranking of the relative eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial markets across countries
which is consistent across parameterizations and size proxies. Table 4 shows that the
UK is good at allocating market ﬁnance to all the industries and not just the industries
with large ﬁrms. Table 5 shows that a similar result holds for Germany. In contrast,
the French, Italian and Spanish economies seem to mainly allocate intermediated
ﬁnance to industries with small ﬁrms and this suggests that these ﬁnancial systems
are characterized by a higher relative cost of market ﬁnance.
Tables 6 and 7 show a similar picture after adding industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Yet because
of the small cross-section of countries, some of the estimated coeﬃcient are not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Further research on including data from more countries
is necessary to allow more precise estimates of the coeﬃcients.
Interpretation. A low estimated cost of market ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁ-
nance for the UK is consistent with the existing literature that categorizes it as a
“market-based” ﬁnancial system (Allen and Gale, 2000). London is a major interna-
tional center for banking and ﬁnancial markets.
However, since Germany has been considered an archetype of a “bank-based” ﬁnan-
cial system, the estimated low relative cost of market ﬁnance can be surprising. Yet,
Vitols (2005) describes the deep transformation of the German ﬁnancial system over
the last 10 years. He argues that large privately owned banks “are attempting to
weaken their links with companies and shift their focus toward fee-based activities
such as investment banking and asset management. Partly in response to the de-
mands of these banks, German policymakers have initiated regulatory reforms in an
eﬀort to strengthen the role of equity markets.” The main innovations have been the
introduction of new regulation and the creation of the Neuer Markt which led to a
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market ﬁnance in Germany over the period we study (1990-2005).
France, Italy and Spain are typically classiﬁed as “bank-based” ﬁnancial systems and
this is consistent with our ﬁndings. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) reports
that ﬁrms raising equity ﬁnance from an IPO are much larger in Italy than in the
US, which suggests that raising market ﬁnance in Italy is relatively expensive. Sa´ a-
Requejo (1996) reports in 1996 that banks are at the core of the Spanish economy
and that security markets are underdeveloped.
Previous literature has classiﬁed ﬁnancial systems using endogenous ﬁnancing pat-
terns (in particular the share of market ﬁnance in total external ﬁnance) instead of
estimated structural parameters as we do here (see Allen and Gale 2000; Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine 2001). Estimating the ﬁnancing costs allows to decompose two
components that inﬂuence ﬁnancing patterns. We rewrite the estimated equation as:
logSij = logS
∗ + ˆ θj(σij − σ
∗)
The regression country-ﬁxed eﬀect is logS∗ − σ∗ˆ θj where σ∗ the scale parameter for
a reference industry with very large ﬁrms and S∗ is the share of market ﬁnance for
such industry. The diﬀerence in the share of market ﬁnance for a given industry i
across two countries j1 and j2:
logSi,j1 − logSi,j2 = ˆ θj1(σi,j1 − σi,j2)
| {z }
(1)





where σ∗ > σi,j2. In equation (3.2), a high share of market ﬁnance Si,j1 can be due to
a high proportion of large ﬁrms (term (1): a high σi,j) or a low cost of market ﬁnance
(term (2) : low ˆ θj1).
When the cost of market ﬁnance and the distribution of ﬁrms sizes are estimated
separately, we ﬁnd a correlation between the two. Figure 4 shows a plot with the size
ordering and the average ranking for the estimated relative costs of market ﬁnance
across countries. Although with only a few data points, this plot suggests that there
might be a positive relation between the relative cost of market ﬁnance and the
proportion of large ﬁrms. This means that the two eﬀects in equation (3.2) reinforce
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low cost of market ﬁnance but also because it has larger ﬁrms. Similarly, Italy has
a low share of market ﬁnance because it has smaller ﬁrms and a higher relative cost
of market ﬁnance. The following section provides an explanation based on welfare
maximization for the correlation between the ﬁnancing costs and the distribution of
ﬁrms sizes.
IV. Evaluation of the financial system
In this section, we evaluate the link between ﬁnancial structure and the characteristics
of the population of ﬁrms. In an attempt to partially endogenize the relation between
ﬁnancing costs and the distribution of productivity across ﬁrms, we look at how
the marginal incentives of a planner to modify the ﬁnancial structure depend on
the characteristics population of ﬁrms. Note that the analysis in this section does
not suggest any causal link beyond the correlation. We show that the incentive to
modify the ﬁnancing costs given the distribution of productivity is closely related
to the incentive to modify the distribution of productivity given the ﬁnancing costs.
We ﬁrst study at the case without ﬁnancial frictions (ξ = 0). We then discuss how
ﬁnancial frictions modify the analysis.
Problem 1: Incentives to modify the ﬁnancial structure given the distribution of pro-
ductivity. The welfare of the private agents (investors and entrepreneurs) is evalu-
ated for diﬀerent combinations of ﬁnancing costs hη,δi against the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes. More precisely, we analyze the marginal incentives of a planner who maxi-
mizes the welfare of private agents to decrease the costs of market and intermediated
ﬁnance for diﬀerent distribution of productivity (and hence diﬀerent distribution of
ﬁrm sizes). A simple utilitarian welfare criteria adds the utility of the representative
investor and the proﬁt of the entrepreneurs:
W = U + V
where U is the utility that investors derive from consumption in the two periods and
V is the sum of proﬁts of entrepreneurs: V =
R +∞
ϕB p(ϕ)rb(ϕ)f(ϕ)dϕ. The welfare
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considers the situation when there are no ﬁnancial frictions.
Proposition 2. When there are no ﬁnancial frictions (ξ = 0), economies with large
ﬁrms have a marginal incentive to decrease the ﬁxed cost of ﬁnance η while economies
with small ﬁrms have a marginal incentive to decrease the proportional cost of inter-
mediated ﬁnance δ, ie. for two countries j1 and j2:























The intuition for Proposition 2 is that, when there are no frictions, decreasing the
cost of one instrument only aﬀects the proﬁt of ﬁrms using this instrument. Decreas-
ing the cost of market ﬁnance only aﬀects the large ﬁrms while decreasing the cost
of intermediated ﬁnance only aﬀects the small ﬁrms. Hence, the larger the ﬁrms,
the bigger the incentive to decrease the cost of market ﬁnance and the smaller the
incentive to decrease the cost of intermediate ﬁnance.
This result rationalizes that countries with large ﬁrms have a lower cost of market
ﬁnance because the accumulation of policy decisions concerning the ﬁnancial structure
should take into account the marginal incentives of investors and entrepreneurs and
lead to adjusting the relative cost of market ﬁnance given the distribution of ﬁrm
sizes.
Problem 2: Incentives to modify the the distribution of productivity given the ﬁnancial
structure. The result of proposition 2 does not suggest a causal link between the
ﬁnancing costs and the distribution of productivity. In fact equation (4.1) can be
interpreted as the incentives of a planner to adjust the distribution of productivity
given the ﬁnancial structure and we now show that the two problems are equivalent.
Assume that the two countries j1 and j2 have the same distribution of productivity f
but have two diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures characterized by the ﬁnancing costs hδ1,η1i
and hδ2,η2i. We assume that the country 2 has a lower cost of market ﬁnance but
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distribution of productivity f. To make this assumption clear, we assume:
δ2 = δ1 − ν
∂W(δ1,η1|f)
∂η
η2 = η1 + ν
∂W(δ1,η1|f)
∂δ
where ν > 0 is small.26 We consider the incentives of countries j1 and j2 to increase
the proportion of high productivity ﬁrms from distribution f to distribution h  f.
The welfare of country j2 under distribution h:


























is exactly what we showed in Proposition 2 with h  f. In words, country j2 has
a higher incentive to modify the distribution of productivity from f to h  f than
country j1 because it has a lower relative cost of market ﬁnance.
Introducing ﬁnancial frictions. When there are ﬁnancial frictions (ξ > 0), following
Remark 5 and the discussion in Section II.1, the aggregate allocation hce,K(ce)i
depends on the ﬁnancing costs. So changing the ﬁnancing costs has not only a direct
eﬀect on the proﬁt of the entrepreneurs but also an indirect eﬀect on the welfare of
all the agents through the equilibrium allocation. In what follows, we break down the
diﬀerent eﬀects of a change in the ﬁnancing costs. First, when we look at a decrease

















































































∂δ are negative, country j2 has a lower relative cost of market ﬁnance.
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M)]. First note that
∂ϕM
∂η > 0 and ∂c
∂η > 0. When the cost of market
ﬁnance η decreases, so does the threshold for market ﬁnance ϕM. Also when there
are frictions, a decrease in η reduces the domain for intermediated ﬁnance and overall
the frictions in investment. In turn because of the substitution eﬀect, consumption
decreases and aggregate investment increases.
We now look at equation (4.2). The term (1) is related to a reallocation eﬀect for
the proﬁt of the entrepreneurs. From a decrease in the cost of market ﬁnance ∂η < 0
and in ﬁrst-period consumption ∂c < 0, the proﬁt of all ﬁrms decreases except for
those switching from intermediated to market ﬁnance. From the point of view of
a country with large ﬁrms, this eﬀect is ambiguous. On the one hand, it decreases
the proﬁt of small ﬁrms, so the fewer small ﬁrms the better. However on the other
hand, the reallocation leads to spreading investment across all ﬁrms receiving market
ﬁnance which tends to be unfavorable to large ﬁrms (and so countries with large
ﬁrms).28 The term (2) is a switching eﬀect for the entrepreneurs. Firms switching
from intermediated ﬁnance to market ﬁnance set the optimal investment size because
they are no longer subjected to ﬁnancial frictions and thereby see a jump in proﬁt.
The larger the ﬁrms in the country, the stronger this eﬀect is. The term (3) is also a
reallocation eﬀect, this time for the investor. Similarly to the reallocation eﬀect for
entrepreneurs, it is ambiguous. The same decomposition can be done for the eﬀect



















































∂δ < 0 and ∂c
∂δ < 0. When the cost of intermediated ﬁnance δ
decreases, the threshold for market ﬁnance ϕM increases. In addition, a decrease in














28Note that from an extension of Lemma 1 in Section I.3, we have ∂rb










is increasing in ϕ which is the key to showing that spreading the allocation
across all ﬁrms receiving market ﬁnance is unfavorable to countries with large ﬁrm.
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in investment. In turn because of the substitution eﬀect, consumption increases and
aggregate investment decreases. As before the reallocation eﬀects are ambiguous.
However the switching eﬀect reinforces the direct eﬀect. The proﬁt of some ﬁrms
decreases from switching to intermediated ﬁnance because the threshold for market
ﬁnance increases when ∂δ < 0. However, this switching eﬀect is decreasing with the
proportion of small ﬁrms. Another perspective comes from thinking of decreasing
the ﬁnancial frictions parameter ξ. Intuitively the direct eﬀect of reducing ξ is to
increase the proﬁt of ﬁrms raising intermediated ﬁnance, and this is most favorable
to countries with small ﬁrms.
When do these indirect eﬀects matter? The importance of these eﬀects depends




∂ξ. These derivatives are small when the ﬁnancial frictions ξ are small.
Another case is when the elasticity of production α is large or the relative risk aversion
γ is small. In that case, from Remark 1, we know that the investment function
c 7→ K(c) has a steep slope and a perturbation on the function K has a small impact
on the equilibrium consumption ce.29
V. Robustness of the identification method
This section demonstrates that our main identiﬁcation is robust to alternative speci-
ﬁcations of the structural relation between ﬁnancing patterns and the ﬁrm size distri-
bution. Instead of characterizing ﬁnancing patterns using the share of market ﬁnance
in total external ﬁnance, we consider the ratio of market ﬁnance to intermediated ﬁ-
nance. Section V.1 provides some motivation for using the ratio of market ﬁnance
and derive the condition under which the ﬁnancing costs can be identiﬁed. Section
V.2 shows that the empirical results using the ratio of market ﬁnance are in line with








∂ω is small when ∂K
ω is small (small frictions) or when ∂K
∂c is large (high
elasticity of production or small relative risk-aversion).
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where kM = k(ϕM) and kB = k(ϕB). Similarly to what has been done for the share of
market ﬁnance, we are interested in studying properties of the equilibrium concerning
the ratio of market ﬁnance Ri.
The motivation for using the ratio of market ﬁnance to intermediated ﬁnance (instead
of the share of market ﬁnance) is that any country-bias in the collection of data will
be absorbed by the country ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed, if you suppose for instance that only
a proportion ζc of intermediated ﬁnance is collected in country c, then the diﬀerence
between the true (log) ratio of market ﬁnance and the observed (log) ratio of market
ﬁnance is exactly logζc. For the regression
logRij = [controls] + ϑjσij + ij (5.1)
the estimate of the country-speciﬁc slope ϑj is not biased. Of course, in order to
interpret ϑj the same way as we did for θi (Section II.1), the model has to yield a
monotone relation between the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (as ordered by Deﬁnition
1) and the derivative of the (log) ratio of market ﬁnance to intermediated ﬁnance
with respect to the ﬁnancing costs η and δ. Unfortunately, a decrease in the cost
of market ﬁnance η (or similarly an increase in the cost of intermediated ﬁnance δ)
has two eﬀects. Not only does it increase the number of ﬁrms raising market ﬁnance,
but it also decreases the number of ﬁrm raising intermediated ﬁnance. Both eﬀects
contribute to decreasing the ratio of market ﬁnance but the ﬁrst eﬀect is bigger when
there are large ﬁrms and the second is bigger when there are small ﬁrms.
We show however the parametrization of Section II.2 have some properties imply-
ing that the identiﬁcation of ﬁnancing costs from using the ratio of market ﬁnance
(instead of the share of market ﬁnance) is still valid. We start with the exponential
parametrization of the ﬁrm size distribution:
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December 2006for the industry i. Since we parameterize the ﬁrm size distribution, we also assume
for simplicity that it does not depend on the ﬁnancing costs. This is the case when
there are no frictions (ξ = 0).
Proposition 3. An industry with larger ﬁrms raises more market ﬁnance:
σi > σj ⇒ Ri > Rj







The ratio of market ﬁnance to intermediated ﬁnance increases more with the relative
eﬃciency of markets in industries with small ﬁrms:










V.2. Regression results with the ratio of market ﬁnance. Tables 8 and 9 show
the results. As for the share of market ﬁnance, we ﬁnd that the estimated country-
speciﬁc slope coeﬃcient is much ﬂatter for the UK and Germany than for France,
Germany and Spain. Italy has a much larger slope coeﬃcient. These results conﬁrm
that the UK and Germany have a low relative cost of market ﬁnance and Italy, a
high relative cost of market ﬁnance, with Spain and France somewhere in between.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we developed a structural model of ﬁnancing and investment with
an endogenous aggregate supply of capital from a representative investor and an
endogenous aggregate demand for capital from a population of entrepreneurs running
heterogeneous projects. The model linked the share of market ﬁnance in total external
ﬁnance and the distribution of ﬁrm sizes through a structural relation that depends
on the technology and on the ﬁnancial system. We used data on ﬁnancing patterns
and characteristics of the population of ﬁrms from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom to estimate the ﬁnancing costs that characterize the ﬁnancial
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December 2006system and found that the United Kingdom has a low cost of market ﬁnance (relative
to intermediated ﬁnance) and Italy has a high relative cost of market ﬁnance.
Using the structural model, we then explored the incentives of a central planner who
maximizes the sum of the welfare of private agents (entrepreneurs and investors)
to modify the ﬁnancial structure or the technology. We found a complementarity
between ﬁnancial structure and distribution of ﬁrm sizes, in the sense that economies
with large ﬁrms have a higher marginal incentive to decrease the cost of market
ﬁnance than economies with smaller ﬁrms. This was mirrored by the ﬁnding that
economies with a low relative cost of market ﬁnance have a higher incentive to increase
the proportion of high productivity ﬁrms than economies with a higher relative cost
of market ﬁnance. This complementarity between ﬁnancial and distribution of ﬁrm
sizes provided a preliminary explanation for the negative correlation across countries
between the proportion of large ﬁrms and the cost of market ﬁnance (relative to
intermediated ﬁnance).
This paper suggests two possible avenues for further research. First the general-
ity and robustness of the identiﬁcation strategy for estimating the ﬁnancing costs
came from a model with generic correlation across projects and generic utility and
production functions. However the ability of the model to produce interesting coun-
terfactual exercises has been limited precisely because we only estimated parts of it.
Estimating the full model would allow to provide more precise statements on the
optimal ﬁnancial structure given our stylized welfare measure. Second, the implicit
assumption of this paper was that countries are in ﬁnancial autarky. This is a stark
assumption especially for countries in the European Union. Opening international
ﬁnancial trade in such a framework generates diversiﬁcation gains for the investors
and higher investment and proﬁt for some of the entrepreneurs (those with the most
productive projects). Further research is necessary to derive precise predictions for
the structure of international ﬁnancial ﬂows and the gains from ﬁnancial integration.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the repayment re
l (p,c), the supply of size ke(p,c), the ﬁrm’s proﬁt re
b(p,c)
and the total production re(p,c) are increasing functions of the probability of production p and the
equilibrium consumption c.





. Because r(rl,p) is concave in rl (Assumption
2), the function rl 7→
∂r(rl,p)
∂rl is decreasing in rl. It is also increasing in p (since the revenue function
has at least positive returns to scale, ie. k 7→ kr0(k) is increasing). Therefore p 7→ re
l (p) is increasing.
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), we get ke(p
+








∂p > 0, so re
b(p
+
). Finally re(p) = re
b(p) + re
l (p) is also increasing in p. 
Lemma 2. The aggregate investment function K(c) is increasing in c.
Proof. Since r∗
b is a increasing function of c, then for all ϕ, 1{r∗
b(ϕ,c)} is also a increasing function of
c, and ﬁnally also K(c
+
). 
Lemma 3. An industry with larger ﬁrms raises more market ﬁnance:
fi  fj ⇔ gi  gj ⇒ Si > Sj













After rearranging the terms, we ﬁnd Si > Sj. 
Proposition 1. A country with more eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets raises more market ﬁnance:




Monotone sensitivity property: The share of market ﬁnance increases more with the relative eﬃ-
ciency of markets in industries with small ﬁrms:







Proof. We look separately at the cases with and without ﬁnancial frictions.
Case ξ = 0. Since there is no friction and for any ω ∈ {δ,η−1},
∂ϕM



















Case ξ > 0. The aggregate investment is: K(c) =
R +∞
ϕB ke(ϕ,c)f(ϕ)dϕ. Because of frictions (ξ > 0),
the investment function ke(ϕ,c) is discontinuous at ϕM. It is only because of the frictions that in
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December 2006Moreover, ϕM depends on the relative costs of ﬁnance η, δ. So with frictions, K(c) depends on























































































































































































































































































































is the derivative without the general equilibrium eﬀect. The
term ∆GE is the adjustment due to the general equilibrium eﬀect that goes through the discontinuity
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M,c) and ∆GE is equal to 1.
Otherwise, ∆GE < 1. The equation (A.2) shows that
∂ log S
∂ω > 0.
We turn to the monotone sensitivity property. We assume fi  fj and denote ∆i
GE and ∆i
GE the



































































































and the general equilibrium eﬀect ampliﬁes the monotone sensitivity property. 







Proof. Data in one country {Si,xni : i ∈ [1,I],n ∈ [1,Ni]}. Denote N =
P
Ni and ni = Ni
N . In
the ﬁrst stage, we estimate σi by maximum likelihood using the AEP distribution. We then have
ˆ σi →p σ0
i . In the second stage we regress the log of the share of market ﬁnance logSi on ˆ σi using
for instance ordinary-least squares (OLS). Denote s the score of the second stage. We are interested
in the adjustment to the asymptotic distribution due to the ﬁrst-stage. Assume I and N go to ∞,
while ni stays constant. We have:
√

































Ni(ˆ σi − σ0
i )
#
where A0 = E[H(v0,σ0
i )] is the expectation of the Hessian of the second stage.
√
Ni(ˆ σi − σ0
i )
converges to a Normal distribution with mean 0 from the ﬁrst stage. So the adjustment due to the







Proposition 2.When there are no ﬁnancial frictions, ﬁnancial systems with large ﬁrms have a
marginal incentives to decrease the ﬁxed cost of ﬁnance η while ﬁnancial systems with small ﬁrms
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countries c and d:


















Proof. First, if there is not ﬁnancial frictions, then the welfare of the investors U is independent of
ﬁnancing fees. It suﬃcient to look at the welfare of entrepreneur V . Denote ˆ r(ϕ) = re(ϕ)−re
l (ϕ) > 0
the equilibrium pre-ﬁnancing fees proﬁt. Then






































ˆ r(u)p(u)p(v)[fc(u)fd(v) − fd(u)fc(v)]dudv
If fc  fd, then for u < v, fc(u)fd(v)−fd(u)fc(v) < 0, and since ˆ r(ϕ) > 0, this yields the result. 
Proposition 3 An industry with larger ﬁrms raises more market ﬁnance:
σi > σj ⇒ Ri > Rj







The ratio of market ﬁnance to intermediated ﬁnance increases more with the relative eﬃciency of
markets in industries with small ﬁrms:
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and for any ω ∈ {δ,η−1}, ∂kM






















The essential diﬀerence is that an increase in the relative market eﬃciency parameter ω has two
eﬀects formalized by the terms (1) and (2) in equation (A.3). The term (1) is the same term as
in the share of market ﬁnance and it means that an increase in ω increase the proportion of ﬁrms
raising market ﬁnance. This term is “decreasing” in the sense that industries with larger ﬁrms
have a smaller increase in market ﬁnance due to term (1). The second term (2) is a new term
and is related to the fact that as ω increases, the proportion of ﬁrms raising intermediated ﬁnance
decreases. This term is “increasing” in the sense that industries with larger ﬁrms have a bigger
decrease in intermediated ﬁnance due to term (2). Therefore, the contributions of the terms (1) and
(2) go in opposite directions as functions of the distribution g.














It is therefore suﬃcient to study how the function
∂H(a,b,g)
∂b depends on f. For
log R
∂ω decreasing in







i2 decreasing in g


















∂σ. We introduce K(x) =
R x kg(k)dk and l(x) =
gσ[K
−1(k)]









It is clear that inequality (A.5) holds for any a and b if and only if l is convex. We now show that the
exponential power parametrization of g implies that l is convex. The convexity of l is determined
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is increasing. Moreover for the























which is indeed an increasing function. 
Appendix B: General specification of the financing cost structure
In this section, we consider more general functional forms for the choice between public and private
securities. It now depends on payment structures that involve the (deadweight) costs κM(π,rl,ϕ)
and κB(π,rl,ϕ), where rl is the repayment to the investor and π = r(k)−rl is the surplus generated
by production. We only assume that market ﬁnance involves a higher ﬁxed cost component than
intermediated ﬁnance and intermediated ﬁnance involves a higher proportional cost component:
κM(0,0,ϕ0) > 0; κM
π (π,rl,ϕ) ≈ κM
rl (π,rl,ϕ) ≈ κM
ϕ (π,rl,ϕ) ≈ 0 (B.1)
and
κB(0,0,ϕ0) ≈ 0; κB
π (π,rl,ϕ) > 0
κB
rl(π,rl,ϕ) > 0; κB
ϕ(π,rl,ϕ) < 0
(B.2)
where by notation, for any y, κy = ∂κ
∂y. The investment size depends on the maximization:
rb =
(
maxk π − κB[π, ˜ rl(k|ϕ,c),ϕ] if intermediated ﬁnance
maxk π − κM[π, ˜ rl(k|ϕ,c),ϕ] if market ﬁnance
where π = r(k) − ˜ rl(k|ϕ,c). The ﬁrst-order condition is:
∂π
∂k
(1 − κπ) −
∂˜ rl
∂k
κrl = 0 (B.3)
Equation (B.3) implies that there is underinvestment whenever κrl > 0. When κrl = 0, the ﬁrst-best
level of investment is set such that ∂π
∂k = 0 and does not depend on which ﬁnancial instrument is
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Number of issuance deals and matched industries per country.. The data on the share of market ﬁnance
comes from SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005). The data on the distribution of ﬁrm sizes comes
from Amadeus (year 2003).
Size proxy Deals Total assets Operating revenues
France 2502 39 39
Germany 1680 32
Italy 700 17 17
Spain 772 19 19
United Kingdom 7415 47
Total 13069 122 107
being used. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm rb determines the choice of instrument. Using the ﬁrst-order











(1 − κπ − κrl) − κϕ (B.4)
Equation (B.4) has several important implications. Whenever the values of the derivatives κπ, κrl
and κϕ are small enough, the proﬁt rb is increasing in ϕ. Moreover, under the assumptions of
equations (B.1-B.2), when κϕ is small, the proﬁt of the entrepreneur is increasing more with the
type ϕ when he uses market ﬁnance instead of intermediated ﬁnance. Finally, assuming that the
ﬁxed cost component of market ﬁnance is larger than that of intermediated ﬁnance (κM(0,0,ϕ0) >
κB(0,0,ϕ0)), there exists a threshold ϕM at which ﬁrms switch from intermediated to market ﬁnance
and this threshold is unique.
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Scale parameters per country. This table describes the scale parameters for the Asymmetric-Laplace (AL) and
Asymmetric Normal (AN) distributions. The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
Total assets Operating revenues
Country name N σAL σAN N σAL σAN
France 679666 1.616 2.186 649021 1.494 1.964
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Germany 460710 1.491 1.854
(0.003) (0.004)
Italy 212010 1.347 1.691 209737 1.238 1.513
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Spain 540493 1.460 1.907 501914 1.334 1.725
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
United Kingdom 952151 1.762 2.304
(0.003) (0.005)
Table 3.
Index for the econometric adjustment due to ﬁrst stage estimation.. This table shows an index that
relates the number of observations of ﬁrm sizes in each industry to the number of industries in a country. The data
on the share of market ﬁnance comes from SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005). The data on the
distribution of ﬁrm sizes comes from Amadeus (year 2003).
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Share of market ﬁnance regressions: Total Assets. We relate the share of market ﬁnance Sic for industry i,
country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC
Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust
errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Share of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no
N 122 122 122 122
R2 .208 .205 .243 .234
Table 5.
Share of market ﬁnance regressions: Operating revenues. We relate the share of market ﬁnance Sic for
industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets).
Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated
(robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Share of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no
N 107 107 107 107
R2 .174 .16 .178 .164
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Robustness check. Share of market ﬁnance regressions with industry controls: Total Assets. We relate
the share of market ﬁnance Sic for industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm
sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year
2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Share of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 122 122 122 122
R2 .441 .433 .452 .445
Table 7.
Robustness check. Share of market ﬁnance regressions with industry controls: Operating revenues.
We relate the share of market ﬁnance Sic for industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus
(year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Share of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 107 107 107 107
R2 .293 .282 .292 .28
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Ratio of market ﬁnance regressions: Total Assets. We relate the ratio of market ﬁnance Ric for industry i,
country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC
Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust
errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Ratio of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no
N 122 122 122 122
R2 0.234 0.248 0.267 0.273
Table 9.
Ratio of market ﬁnance regressions: Operating revenues. We relate the ratio of market ﬁnance Ric for
industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets).
Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated
(robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Ratio of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no
N 107 107 107 107
R2 0.229 0.238 0.233 0.251
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Robustness check. Ratio of market ﬁnance regressions with industry controls: Total Assets. We relate
the ratio of market ﬁnance Ric for industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution of ﬁrm
sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus (year
2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Ratio of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 122 122 122 122
R2 0.528 0.537 0.538 0.551
Table 11.
Robustness check. Ratio of market ﬁnance regressions with industry controls: Operating revenues.
We relate the ratio of market ﬁnance Ric for industry i, country c to the the scale parameter σic of the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes (size variable: total assets). Data: SDC Platinum New Issues Database (years 1990-2005), Amadeus
(year 2003). The t-statistics are indicated (robust errors).
Dependent variable (Log) Ratio of market ﬁnance
Model Asymmetric log-Laplace Asymmetric log-Normal











Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 107 107 107 107
R2 0.390 0.404 0.397 0.418
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Fit of ﬁrm size distribution: an example. This ﬁgure describes the distribution of the size proxy ”Operating
revenue” for the industry ”Building/Construction & Engineering” in Germany as ﬁt by a (log) Asymmetric Laplace
and (log) Asymmetric Normal parameterizations. Each parametrization ﬁts the distribution with three parameters


















The relation between ﬁnancial structure and ﬁrm size distribution. This ﬁgure plots at the country level
the average rankings of the estimated relative cost of market ﬁnance against the ranking of the estimated scale
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